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Abstract. In this study we examine the effect of severance pay on employment and unem-
ployment, using data on industrialized OECD countries. Our starting point is Lazear’s [(1990)
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 699–726] dictum that severance payment requirements
unfavorably impact the labor market. We extend his sample period and add to his parsimo-
nious specification a variety of fixed and time-varying labor market institutions. While the
positive effect of severance pay on unemployment garners some support, there is no real
indication of adverse effects in respect of the other employment outcomes identified here,
namely, the employment-population ratio, the labor force participation rate, and long-term
unemployment. Moreover, with the possible exception of collective bargaining coordination,
the role of institutions is also more muted than suggested in the literature.
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I. Introduction
Refocused by the work of Lazear (1990), analysis of the impact of job
security provisions on labor market outcomes was among the most studied
topics in labor economics during the decade of the 1990s and, now extending
beyond proximate causation, shows every sign of continuing to be a key
research theme in the first decade of the new millennium (see, in particular,
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Botero et al., 2004).1 Interest in employment protection remains keen be-
cause of continuing high unemployment and sluggish growth in much of
Europe. However, the economics profession has failed to provide consistent
results on the consequences of employment protection, as is evidenced by the
very pessimistic conclusions of, say, Heckman and Page´s (2000) on the one
hand and the guarded optimism of the OECD (1999) on the other.
Although theory can provide the basis for different expectations regarding
the effects of employment protection on labor market outcomes, data limi-
tations would seem in this case to have played a more important role than
usual in accounting for diversity of finding (on which, see Addison and Te-
ixeira, 2003). The data problems are reflected in models that are parsimonious
in both the range of explanatory variables deployed and in the time frame
examined. To be sure, in the years following Lazear’s pioneering analysis the
data situation has improved in terms of refinements to the key independent
variable and with the availability of information on new regressors. Never-
theless, data constraints have continued to cast a long shadow over the eco-
nomic analysis of employment protection. In particular, the needs of wider
country coverage and an extended time series have consequences for the
number of explanatory variables than can be included in the empirical model.
The tradeoffs that have to be made ought to have inculcated more humility on
the part of investigators than is apparent in the literature.
The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, we seek to document
the problems arising from the prototypical parsimonious model, using Laz-
ear’s famous paper as an organizing device. In updating Addison et al.
(2000), we will further discuss the robustness of Lazear’s major findings on
the effects of his preferred measure of job security – namely, the no-fault
severance pay granted to a blue-collar worker with 10 years service, or SEV –
on employment and unemployment rates. Our sample covers an (extended)
interval of more than four decades, namely, from 1956 to 1999. In a new
departure, we will also address the course of long-term unemployment – and
drop the average weekly hours worked by production workers measure used
by Lazear2 – albeit for a shorter sample period (1979–1999).
Our second goal is to determine whether the use of more comprehensive
measures of job protection (such as the OECD composite index of the
severity or coerciveness of employment laws, given in Table I below) and the
incorporation of other labor market institutions lead to different labor
market outcomes than suggested by the SEV regressor alone. Replacement of
the partial indicator SEV by some composite index capturing other seemingly
important aspects of the job regulatory framework – such as a measure of
procedural delays in dismissals and the permissibility of fixed-term contracts
– is expected to improve the explanatory power of the model, although this
advantage might be compromised by a shortened time series. Similarly, the
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failure to model (the degree of) collective bargaining coverage or (the extent
of) employee and employer coordination in wage bargaining might be no less
serious a source of bias in the estimated parameters than the use of a partial
indicator of employment protection.
As a practical matter, most measures of ‘labor market institutions’ are
seldom available in a continuous form. They are either one-off, purpose-built
constructs or observed only at a few points in time.3 This reality leaves the
researcher with two options: either assume these variables have effects that
are roughly constant over time and run the model on fixed institutions (in
which case the analysis can be extended to cover almost half a century), or
instead assume time-varying institutions and trade a presumably more
informative set of institutions off against a substantially smaller number of
observations (through the reduction in the respective time series). To evaluate
the sensitivity of the parsimonious specification used by Lazear, therefore, we
shall follow two routes. First, we use annual data in conjunction with fixed
institutions throughout (i.e. from 1956 up to 1999). Second, and this is our
preferred route, we average our annual data on (four) labor market perfor-
mance indicators over 5-year periods and use time-varying institutions for
which we have observations at different moments in time (at least three). The
sample period in this case is necessarily shorter and covers the period 1970–
1999 (1979–1999 in the case of the long-term unemployment equation).
Assuming fixed labor market institutions over a period of almost half a
century – the first route – seems at first glance rather heroic, but this par-
ticular pooling of cross-section and time-series data offers an indication of
the effect of time-varying severance pay over an extended period that is
embedded within in a richer institutional context. The second route (i.e.
dropping the assumption of fixed institutions) reduces both the sample period
and the number of institutions, but at least eliminates the need for interpo-
lation in order to obtain (artificial) annual time-varying data. This approach,
which also allows the researcher to focus on the long-term impact of policy
intervention in labor markets, has found some favor in the literature (see
Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bertola et al., 2001). Observe
that our set of time-varying labor institutions and range of labor market
performance indicators is wider than has been used in this literature.
II. Modeling and Data
1. SPECIFICATION
The sample panel structure of our database allows for a wide range of sen-
sitivity tests. In the most favorable case, we will be able to work with data on
20 OECD countries over 44 consecutive years.4
We will begin with the standard Lazear specification containing country
specific effects, which can be written:
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yit ¼ ci þ
X
j
Xijtbj þ eit; ð1Þ
where y denotes the particular labor market outcome, X is the set of explan-
atory and control variables, and c captures the country specific effect. The
outcome indicators are fourfold: the employment-population ratio, the
unemployment rate, the long-term unemployment rate, and the labor force
participation rate. In Lazear’s full model the vector X included in addition to
severance pay and a quadratic in time, a demographic control (the share of the
population aged between 25 and 65 years), and the growth in GDP per capita
(to accommodate the notion that a growing economy vitiates at least in part
the probabilistic costs of severance pay rules). At this stage, the model assumes
away any reverse causation or endogeneity of the explanatory variables –
although Lazear (1990, pp. 722–723) subsequently addresses the causality is-
sue by, among other things, regressing changes in severance pay between t and
t+1 on levels at time t of three of the four dependent variables. In our fitted
regressions we will only address directly the problems arising from autocor-
relation, where our first-pass solution will be to assume a (common) first-order
serially correlated error term. Specifically, this approach will be applied in
generating Tables II–IV, below, which cover the sample period 1956–99.5
Extending the vector X of explanatory variables in Equation (1) to include
measures of labor market institutions requires a slight change to the model
specification and estimation procedures. In particular, since the inclusion of
the additional regressors reduces substantially the length of the panel –
especially if the model includes time-varying variables – GLS random effects
estimates will be used rather than the standard fixed effects model. Within
this framework we will also introduce time dummies to proxy unobserved
cross-country (common) shocks. This approach will be followed in Tables V–
VII, below, and the general formulation can be described as:
yit ¼ ci þ dt þ
X
j
Xijtbj þ eit; ð2Þ
where t denotes the 5-year periods, dt is the time effect for period t, and X
now contains the institutional variables.
Our final model extension includes the interaction of labor market insti-
tutions and time (i.e. unobserved shocks). The interaction terms are intended
to capture the ‘product’ of shocks and institutions, the presumption being
that a particularly unfavorable labor market regulation will impact labor
market performance more severely in bad times. In this case, we use a
nonlinear specification of the following type:
yit ¼ ci þ dtð1þ
X
j
XijtbjÞ þ eit: ð3Þ
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Our findings using this specification are contained in Table IX, with all
variables being expressed in terms of deviations from the sample mean.6
2. DATA
Our database contains observations on a maximum of 20 OECD countries –
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States –
plus Israel. Information on the country sample, labor market outcomes, and
explanatory variables for the base period 1956–84 is provided in Addison
et al. (2000). For present purposes, we limit our comments to how we up-
dated this information between 1985 and 1999.
Information on the employment-population ratio (EMPPOP), the
unemployment rate (UNRATE), and the labor force participation rate
(LFPR) was updated using the OECD publication Labor Market Statistics.
This source was also used to provide information on the remaining depen-
dent variable used in the present treatment, namely, the long-term unem-
ployment rate (LTUNRATE). It will be recalled that LTUNRATE,
information on which was only available from 1979 onward, replaces Laz-
ear’s working hours variable.
We also updated the severance payment variable (i.e. the statutory enti-
tlement in months of pay due to a blue-collar worker with 10 years of service
at termination, separated for reasons unconnected with his/her behavior),
using the detailed information on dismissals procedures for 1992–1999 con-
tained in Bertola et al. (1999). But this material covers only 11 OECD
countries – Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We
therefore supplemented it with data for other countries from the OECD
Employment Outlook (1999, Table 2.2), documenting the changes in sever-
ance pay for no-fault individual dismissals in the 1990s. In this way it was
possible to code the severance payment variable after 1992 for all countries
other than Greece and Israel, so that the series is shorter for these countries.
The two final regressors contained in Lazear – other than the time trend – are
the share of the population aged 25 to 65 years (WRKAGE) and the growth
in GDP per capita (GROWTH). The demographic variable was updated
using the Labor Market Statistics source mentioned earlier, while updated
information on growth was obtained from the International Financial Sta-
tistics Yearbook (IMF, 2002).
To set our severance pay measure, SEV, in wider relief, we also obtained
separate data on the severance pay due to a 40-year-old white-collar employee
made redundant after 10 years of service. The two indicators were then
converted into rankings (in ascending order of generosity/stringency) and are
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reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table I. Column (3) of this table also gives
the country ranking order derived from Heckman and Page´’s (2000) cardinal
measure of firing costs (which seeks to control for the entire tenure-severance
pay profile), while in columns (4) through (8) we introduce some other widely-
used reputation indices, including the employment protection index used by
Nickell (1997). Finally, columns (9) and (10) of the table present the corre-
sponding country rankings on the basis of the protection afforded workers by
industrial relations and social security laws, respectively.
As indicated by the Spearman ranking correlation at the foot of the table,
the three measures of severance pay in columns (1) to (3) are, as expected,
highly correlated but the correlation of severance pay with the broad
employment protection indicators in columns (4) through (8) displays a less
consistent pattern. And the correlations between severance pay and the
indicators of industrial relations and social security are extremely low. For
their part, the broader indicators of the stringency of employment protection
laws are strongly correlated: the correlation coefficients between the column
(6) measure – OECD, late 1990s – and columns (4), (5), (7), and (8) are all
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. There is seemingly no correlation
between the OECD measure and the index of social security reported by
Botero et al. (2004) in column (10).
Finally, six labor market institutions are identified in the present treat-
ment. These are the unemployment insurance replacement rate (UIRR); the
maximum duration of unemployment benefits (MDUB); expenditure on
active labor market policy as a percentage of GDP per member of the labor
force (ALMP); union density (UDEN); collective bargaining coverage
(UCOV); overall employee and employer coordination in wage bargaining
(TCOOR); and the tax wedge (TXWEDGE). As mentioned above, since
none of these series is available on a yearly basis, we constructed 5-year
averages, 1970–1999, using the interpolations described in Appendix
Table AI.7 Data sources and variable definitions are also included in this
table, as well as Nickell’s (1997) time-invariant employment protection index
(EPL). Selected descriptive statistics are given in Appendix Table AII.
III. Findings
As noted earlier, Lazear’s pioneering study acted as the catalyst for more
intensive and systematic study of the effects of job security provisions on
labor market performance. Almost 15 years after its publication, the Lazear
argument that severance pay reduces employment and elevates joblessness (in
imperfectly competitive markets) not only remains a mainstay of orthodoxy
but also continues to attract broad empirical support (see the survey by
Addison and Teixeira, 2003). In what follows while we do not claim to detect
any evidence favoring pro-employment effects of stringent labor regulation,
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we will nonetheless contend that the more flamboyant empirical findings in
the spirit of Lazear need to be interpreted with caution.
To begin with, we take Lazear’s parsimonious model and re-estimate it
using an additional 15 years of data. Next, in recognition that much data on
labor market institutions has only become available in recent years, we test the
robustness of the original model to the inclusion of an extended set of such
explanatory variables, and in the process address some more contemporary
issues. To repeat, in this stage of our empirical analysis we shall look at the
effects of severance pay on unemployment and employment for a longer
sample period than does Lazear (as previously noted, the exception is the long-
term unemployment outcomemeasure that we substitute for Lazear’s working
time indicator and for which we have a much attenuated run of data), and in a
framework that accommodates time-varying labor market institutions.
Table II shows the results of applying the most restrictive version of the
Lazear model, namely, estimation of the effects of severance pay (inter al.) on
labor market outcomes using pooled cross-section time-series data with no
country dummies. As in Addison et al. (2000, Table 2), the results of this
specification are broadly supportive of Lazear’s empirical proposition that
job protection, proxied by the SEV variable, adversely impacts employment,
labor force participation, and overall unemployment. (Also consistent with
Lazear is the statistical insignificance of the GROWTH.SEV interaction and
the well-determined effects of the population control WRKAGE.) For a
shorter time-series, it also appears that the association between SEV and
Table II. Pooled estimations – No country dummies (1956–1999)
Independent
variable
Dependent variable
EMPPOP UNRATE LTUNRATE LFPR
Intercept )0.1305
(0.0393)
0.1129
(0.0276)
)0.1372
(0.3414)
)0.1080
(0.0349)
SEV )0.0064
(0.0007)
0.0032
(0.0005)
0.0243
(0.0045)
)0.0055
(0.0007)
GROWTH )0.1200
(0.0718)
)0.0024
(0.0504)
1.5883
(0.4882)
)0.1320
(0.0638)
GROWTH.SEV 0.0097
(0.0180)
)0.0005
(0.0126)
0.0445
(0.1471)
0.0118
(0.0160)
WRKAGE 0.8703
(0.0614)
)0.1582
(0.0431)
)1.2188
(0.3117)
0.8438
(0.0546)
F(k, N)(k+1)) 72.5 83.9 23.7 108.1
R2 0.35 0.38 0.29 0.44
N 833 832 348 833
The regression includes YEAR and YEAR2 terms. The LTUNRATE series only begins in
1979. N denotes the number of countries multiplied by the number of observations per
country. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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long-term unemployment, LTUNRATE, is both negative and well deter-
mined (column 3).
Since there no obvious reason to neglect national idiosyncrasies, Table III
shows the effect of introducing country fixed effects. Robustness is clearly an
issue. The introduction of country dummies renders the coefficient estimates
of SEV statistically insignificant in both the EMPPOP and LTUNRATE
regressions. The association between SEV and UNRATE remains positive
and well determined while there is a sign reversal in the case of LFPR. The
absence of country fixed effects is statistically rejected in all regressions at the
0.01 level.
We also tested for the presence of autocorrelation. Table IV gives the
results of fitting the fixed effects model assuming a first-order autocorrelation
term. It can be seen that the null of no serial (first-order) correlation is clearly
rejected. As it is apparent, the re-estimation takes no prisoners: none of the
coefficient estimates for SEV is any longer statistically significant at con-
ventional levels.
At this point we are of course reminded of the parsimonious nature of the
Lazear model. This is next issue to be tackled. But thus far at least we would
conclude that the Lazear model has failed to pass muster. This conclusion is
also reached by Addison et al. (2000). The difference here is that we are
updating the database with information for more recent years that, with the
uptick of unemployment, might perhaps have been expected to offer a more
promising milieu for the model.
The parsimony of Lazear’s specification has been addressed in vari-
ous ways in the subsequent literature. But one amendment has proved
Table III. Fixed effects regressions (1956–1999)
Independent variable Dependent variable
EMPPOP UNRATE LTUNRATE LFPR
SEV 0.0005
(0.0005)
0.0017
(0.0005)
0.0084
(0.0071)
0.0011
(0.0005)
GROWTH 0.0089
(0.0368)
)0.0668
(0.0360)
1.5776
(0.2114)
)0.0237
(0.0327)
GROWTH.SEV )0.0008
(0.0088)
0.0064
(0.0086)
0.0444
(0.0630)
0.0033
(0.0078)
WRKAGE 0.5724
(0.0422)
0.0875
(0.0412)
)0.2573
(0.2180)
0.6356
(0.0374)
F(k, N)(k+1)) 67.3 121.1 44.0 199.9
R2 0.83 0.65 0.23 0.83
N 833 832 348 833
The regression includes a constant plus YEAR and YEAR2 terms. The LTUNRATE series
only begins in 1979. The null hypothesis that the country fixed effects are jointly equal to zero
is rejected in all cases. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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increasingly popular, namely, the class of models whose general specification
is described in Equation (2) above. Their distinctive feature is the introduc-
tion of time-varying measures of labor market institutions, on the one hand,
and time dummies as proxies for unobservable shocks, on the other. One of
the first authors to apply this specification was Nickell (1997), who combined
two-time periods – 6-year averages of data for 1983–1988 and 1989–1994 –
with a wide set of explanatory variables.
We begin with a quasi-replication of Nickell’s (1997) approach in Table V.
In this exercise the left hand side variables are again extracted from our own
database, whereas the right hand side variables are taken from Nickell. The
surprising result is the statistical insignificance of most of the parameter
estimates. But there is some support for Lazear’s findings: the higher the EPL
ranking (i.e. the more generous employment protection), the lower the
employment population ratio and labor force participation. Moreover, the
long-term unemployment rate – but not overall unemployment – is also
impacted unfavorably by employment protection legislation. Appendix
Table AIII reports a somewhat different exercise in which both the right
hand side and left hand side variables are taken from our own database, with
the exception of ALMP and benefit duration. There is obvious corroboration
of the findings in Table V. Taken together, these results suggest that quasi-
cross-section data (two data points spanning two decades) if they do not
make a strong case for labor market institutions do offer a measure of
support for Lazear.
Tables VI and VII show the more interesting case in which the number of
data points has been enlarged. But this extension is not achieved without
Table IV. Fixed effects regressions with correction for autocorrelation (1956–1999)
Independent
variable
Dependent variable
EMPPOP UNRATE LTUNRATE LFPR
SEV )0.00052
(0.00046)
0.00085
(0.00054)
0.0043
(0.0073)
)0.00022
(0.00040)
GROWTH )0.00039
(0.01220)
)0.02576
(0.01461)
0.9240
(0.1391)
)0.01235
(0.01064)
GROWTH.SEV 0.00318
(0.00268)
0.00295
(0.00320)
0.1003
(0.0432)
0.00498
(0.00233)
WRKAGE 0.25701
(0.05260)
0.03743
(0.06009)
)0.0018
(0.2720)
0.30429
(0.04604)
F(k, N)(k+1)) 10.7 10.1 13.4 20.5
N 812 811 329 812
The regression includes a constant plus YEAR and YEAR2 terms. The LTUNRATE series
only begins in 1979. The null hypothesis that the country fixed effects are jointly equal to zero
is rejected in all cases. The null hypothesis that the error term is not first-order autoregressive
is also rejected. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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cost. Thus, in Table VI, we have a maximum of nine intervals covering the
entire sample period 1956–1999 and seven fixed labor market institutional
variables (the replacement rate, benefit duration, ALMP, union density,
union coverage, union and employer coordination, and the tax wedge) plus
the severance pay variable. In Table VII the sample period is 1970–1999, but
we have a smaller number of labor market institutions which are now time
varying. The Nickell study considered eight institutional variables of which
one is time-invariant (EPL).
Clearly, these innovations produce an improvement in the precision of the
institutional variables in the case of UNRATE (in both tables). For the other
regressions (EMPPOP, LTUNRATE, and LFPR), the coefficient estimates
are statistically significant in just 6 out of 24 cases in Table VI and in only 3 out
18 cases in Table VII. But the SEV coefficient is now well determined only in 3
out of 8 regressions (taking Tables VI and VII together), whereas in Table V
and the Appendix Table AIII it was well determined in 6 out of 8 cases.
We also report in Table VIII the results from a different exercise using
annual data (1956–1999) in which we have added seven fixed institutional
variables (including the tax wedge) to the full set of original Lazear regressors.8
It can be seen that 14 out of the 32 (i.e. 8  4) coefficient estimates are now
statistically significant, which is a slight improvement over Table VI, for
example, where 11 coefficients were well determined. In particular, the SEV
variable is positively signed and statistically significant in the UNRATE and
LTUNRATE equations (albeit only at the 0.10 level in the latter). Bearing in
mind the results from Table IV above, it can be seen that the SEV coefficient
estimate does show some sensitivity to the inclusion of labor market institu-
tions. Based on the same type of augmented-Lazear specification, we then
sought to determine the degree of sensitivity of the severance pay coefficient in
Table IV to the introduction of all possible combinations of institutional
variables (viz. the seven fixed measures mentioned above). From this exercise it
emerged that the SEV coefficient estimate was never statistically significant in
the EMPPOP regression, but was always positive and well determined in the in
the UNRATE regression. The ‘addition’ of the institutional covariates to the
LTUNRATE regression yielded a marginally statistically significant coefficient
estimate for SEV in roughly 50 percent of the cases, while in the LFPR equation
the estimate was statistically significant (although on this occasion at both the
0.05 and 0.10 levels) in approximately two-thirds of all cases. In sum, while the
sensitivity of the SEV coefficient in the EMPPOP equation seems to be low, in
the other three cases – UNRATE, LFPR and LTUNRATE – sensitivity to
model specification cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, the consequences for
standard Lazear equations of ignoring labor market institutions are arguably
less severe than might be expected, although a more definite conclusion nec-
essarily awaits the provision of better (i.e. annual) data on institutions.
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We should also note that we experimented with alternative measures of
employment protection legislation in substitution for SEV and Nickell’s
(1997) EPL index. But the broad picture is unchanged: the role of institutions
is less ‘active’ than one might expect. Our finding that institutions seem to be
of greater importance in explaining overall unemployment than the other
indicators is also worthy of note. To some degree, it parts company with the
notion that the impact of labor regulations on unemployment is more
ambiguous than its effects on employment.
These remarks bring us finally to model (3). In this model, it is hypoth-
esized that labor institutions only reveal their true ‘color’ in conjunction with
adverse economic conditions (e.g. negative shocks). Accordingly, if a given
country is ‘endowed’ with a non-employment friendly set of labor laws, the
unfavorable impact of the latter may not surface if that nation manages to
avoid hard times. The non-linear specification of Equation (3) is particularly
suited to address the interaction between (observed or unobserved) shocks
and institutions.
In fitting this model to the data we again consider the sample period 1970–
1999 and the same 5-year averages as before. The set of time-varying insti-
tutions is also the same; in particular, we retain the SEV variable as our
indicator of employment protection. In other words, we are implementing
here the ‘work-in-progress’ component of Blanchard and Wolfers’ (2002,
p. C23) analysis, that is to say, a model in which all institutional regressors
are allowed to vary over time. We note that Blanchard and Wolfers at-
tempted to run the model with time-varying institutions, but only in a limited
way, using just the employment protection and unemployment insurance
covariates. Blanchard and Wolfers also focus exclusively on the course of
unemployment, and so do not consider the LTUNRATE, LFPR, and
EMPPOP outcome indicators considered here. (We note that Bertola et al.,
2001, likewise concentrate on unemployment developments.) Finally, observe
that although data on observable shocks is available we restrict our attention
to the case of unobservable shocks proxied by time dummies.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table IX. In only 7 out of 24
cases are the labor market institutional parameters estimated with precision.
The SEV variable is statistically significant in just the UNRATE equation,
while UCOV and TCOOR are never statistically significant. Most surpris-
ingly, developments in long-term unemployment are almost solely explained
by country and time effects, with no role reserved for labor market institu-
tions. We note parenthetically that the restricted version of model (3) – that
is, the model in which Xij is time invariant – fully replicates Blanchard and
Wolfers findings for unemployment (e.g. their Table 1), with all variables
being identically signed and statistically significant (the active labor market
policy and union density covariates are not statistically significant). Applying
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the same model to the EMPPOP, LFPR, and LTUNRATE outcomes re-
vealed approximately the same pattern as described in Table IX. In the case
of the long-term unemployment regression, none of the coefficient estimates
was statistically significant. What these results show is the seemingly inability
of labor market institutions as a whole to materially impact labor market
outcomes under the more realistic scenario of time-varying indicators. The
SEV variable, with the exception of the unemployment case, does not seem to
play any particularly prominent role either. The attenuated role of collective
bargaining coordination is further weakened.
IV. Conclusions
The directional effects of job security provisions on job turnover (i.e. job
creation and job destruction) and on unemployment flows are fairly well
established. Net effects are less firmly established, despite widespread
acceptance of the view that stronger employment protection will entail lower
employment and higher unemployment. In the present treatment, we have
offered a wide-ranging combination of empirical strategies in which the ef-
fects of institutions on labor market aggregates are analyzed across a variety
of sample periods, explanatory variables, and estimation techniques.
Our starting point was the influential Lazear study of the role of severance
pay in influencing employment and joblessness. By adding more regressors –
specifically, labor market institutions – to the original Lazear model, we
found little slippage of the unemployment result. Much weaker, however,
was the evidence linking severance pay to the rate of long-term unemploy-
ment, to the employment-population ratio, and to the labor force partici-
pation rate. Surprisingly, in virtually all model specifications and irrespective
of the empirical strategy used, we found low statistical significance of the
other institutional variables. Even the performance of the union and em-
ployer coordination variables, often viewed as favorable to labor market
development, was not impressive overall.
We cannot of course conclude from the foregoing exercise that labor
market institutions – and job protection in particular – do not matter. Ra-
ther, our findings indicate that we simply do not yet know enough about the
role of such institutions, or, expressed differently, that the extent of their
adverse impact on the labor market is not easily gauged. For instance, we
cannot exclude the possibility that different combinations of labor institu-
tions and regulations may produce quite similar outcomes. It may even be the
case that the quest for improved labor market performance is better directed
elsewhere, although we would resist this interpretation, arguing that lingering
uncertainty as to the impact of the institutions identified here is an ines-
capable consequence of the vintage of research in this area.
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Notes
1. For the flavor of the earlier literature, see Buechtemann (1993).
2. Lazear rationalized his finding that average hours were reduced in more generous
employment protection regimes on the grounds that employers might be expected to sub-
stitute unprotected part-time for full-time workers. Yet, as practical matters, not only do
part timers tend to enjoy the same (strictly proportional) employment protection as full
timers but also we were unable to replicate Lazear’s hours results (see Addison et al.,
2000). Accordingly, we chose to substitute for the hours indicator another outcome mea-
sure often used in the literature, namely, long-term unemployment.
3. This raises the specter of research Darwinism, alluded to by Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000, p. C22).
4. Restricting the sample to long-standing OECD nations assures a rectangular data set with
reasonably comparable measures across countries, but a bigger sample might provide richer
insights into the labor market effects of severance pay. In Latin America countries, for exam-
ple, severance pay has historically been the primary mechanism for providing income security
between jobs, whereas nations in our sample have more extensive systems of support. (For
information on income security provisions in Latin America, see Jaramillo and Saavedra,
2003; Ferrer and Riddell, 2003.) Accordingly, severance pay might have more statistical lever-
age in Latin-American nations. Heckman and Page´s (2000) confirm that the level of sever-
ance pay, measured in multiples of monthly wages, is considerably higher in these countries
than in the more industrialized OECD nations, and duly report some very strongly negative
employment effects of their severance pay measure in Latin America. That said, they also find
that unemployment effects are actually stronger for more developed nations.
5. Addison et al. (2000) discuss the problems arising from a panel specification such as
Equation (1).
6. In this case, the difference between the coefficient estimate for the first time dummy and
the last time dummy gives the change in yit due to exogenous shocks (if Xit ¼ X, then
y^it ¼ c^i þ d^tÞ. We do not discuss the case of observable shocks.
7. Lack of data on these labor market institutions for Greece and Israel reduces our sample
to 19 countries once we proceed beyond Lazear’s parsimonious specification.
8. This exercise was carried out using the GLS random effects model to accommodate
time-invariant regressors. The seven fixed regressors used in the model correspond to
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) ‘fixed institutions’ case, where the (fixed) value for each
institution was obtained by averaging the corresponding values computed by Nickell
(1997) for the periods 1983–1988 and 1989–1994.
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